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Can European Union (EU) Social NGOs Co-operate to
Promote EU Social Policy?
RO B E RT  G E Y E R *   
A B S T R AC T
This article examines why, despite similar general interests, institutional
positions and political constraints, EU social NGOs find it so difficult to
develop co-operative strategies except on the most fundamental issues. To
demonstrate these difficulties the article considers the general reasons for
and against co-operation between social NGOs and then examines the 
difficulties and advantages of collective EU social NGO action during the
1998 NGO funding crisis, Red Card protest and civil dialogue. The article
argues that there is a fundamental desire for, and are benefits from, close
co-operation between the EU social NGOs. However, due to the complex
‘context structure’ within which NGOs must operate, this co-operative
impetus is constantly undermined. In conclusion, the article argues 
that social NGOs will remain weak and insignificant actors until 
the Commission/Parliament and/or the social NGOs can organise the
complex context structure and allow co-operative strategies to emerge.
The fate of the European social model has been a central question of the
1980s and 1990s. Debates have raged over its definition, content and
ability to defend itself against the pressures of economic globalisation and
European integration (Hay, 1998; Hay and Marsh, 2000). A central
aspect of this debate has been the development and potential role of EU
social policy. An early assumption of defenders of the European social
model was that a stronger EU social policy could act as a bulwark against
international and European deregulatory and market-oriented forces
(Martin, 1989). Built into this assumption was the hope that EU social
policy could and should be promoted by a strong and extensive array of
European level social non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Often
labelled the ‘civil dialogue’, these social NGOs were supposed to form the
political and institutional backbone of a social policy network which
would help to maintain the ‘human face’ of the EU and by implication
defend the fundamental European social model.
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Despite the high hopes generated by the creation of the EU’s Social
Charter and Social Dimension in the early 1990s, EU social policy has
failed to fulfil these hopes. Likewise, EU social NGOs have generally
remained small, poor and weak organisations exercising only a limited
degree of influence over the EU policy process and struggling to co-operate
with each other on fundamental social issues and political strategies. Why
have EU social policy and the EU social NGOs failed to develop?
The fate of EU social policy is a major issue and has been addressed in a
number of larger works (Beck, 1998; Cram, 1993 and 1997; Falkner,
1998; Geyer, 2000; Gold, 1993; Hantrais, 2000; Leibfried and Pierson,
1995; Majone, 1993 and 1996; Springer, 1994; Sykes and Alcock, 1998).
However, the plight of the social NGOs remains a new and unexplored area.
This article will argue that, even if EU social policy had been more success-
ful, EU social NGOs would have been unlikely to develop beyond their pre-
sent position due to underlying blockages to their co-operative capabilities.
Basically, despite similar general interests, institutional positions and politi-
cal constraints, EU social NGOs are caught within a very complex and
multi-level ‘political opportunity structure’ or ‘context structure’(Marks,
1993; Marks and McAdam, 1996; Marks et al., 1996) which mitigates
against co-operative strategies except on the most fundamental issues. To
explore the nature of this complex and multi-level context, this article will
examine the general reasons for and against co-operation between social
NGOs. Then, it will explore the difficulties and advantages of collective EU
social NGO action through a review of the 1998 NGO funding crisis, Red
Card protest and civil dialogue. 
This article will conclude by arguing that, due to the weakness of EU
social policy and complex context structure, social NGOs remain very
weak at the EU level. Further, the Commission and Parliament (the
strongest institutional supporters of social policy development) have been
unwilling/unable to significantly increase support and funding for social
NGOs, or alter the complex context structure. If the social NGOs are going
to progress, the EU institutions have to simplify their complex context and
organise them and/or the social NGOs have to organise themselves.
Arguably both steps are difficult, but necessary, for the future of social
Europe.
W H Y E U S O C I A L N G O S S H O U L D C O - O P E R AT E A N D W H Y T H E Y D O N ’ T
There is a growing literature on EU interest group activity (Cullen, 1999;
Greenwood, 1997; Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998; Mazey and
Richardson, 1993; McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995; Pedler and Van
Schendelen, 1994; Taylor, 2000) and there are a number of obvious reasons
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why EU social NGOs should be able to co-operate extensively. First, they
are all, relative to most other EU interest groups, young, poor and weak.
Most have only existed since the early 1990s, have minimal financial
resources (under Û500,000 annual budget), a few staff (generally under
5 staff members) and little institutional and political clout within the EU
institutions and with their national and sub-national member organisa-
tions. Second, they generally rely on similar financial resources. Nearly
all of the 30 members of the Platform of European Social NGOs (Platform)
are heavily funded (60–90 per cent of total funding) by the EU. Third,
they have and maintain an extensive informal network. Due to the small
size and number of the social NGOs, their close proximity to each other in
the centre of Brussels and their constant interaction at various European
social policy forums they have evolved a significant informal network as
well. Social NGO actors are aware of each other and are often on first
name basis. Moreover, individuals working for one NGO may often find
employment with another Social NGO. Fourth, they have a common 
formal network. Supported by the EU, the social NGOs have structured
consultations through the Platform, the bi-annual meetings of the
European Social Policy Forum, institutionalised twice yearly meetings
between the Platform, Parliament, Commission and European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC) and frequent policy specific meetings
regarding particular Commission proposals. Fifth, relative to other EU
interest groups, social NGOs are ideologically similar and coherent. Their
broad interest in social issues, containing market forces and promoting
welfarist/social issues makes them politically and ideologically compati-
ble. Consequently, they can often agree on broad policies and principles.
Sixth, they are all caught within a similar institutional position. They are
small and weak actors relative to the supportive Commission and
Parliament and sceptical Council. The have little, if any, control over their
national member organisations. Furthermore, they interact within simi-
lar international, European and national demands and constraints.
Thus, they are often faced with similar pressures, demands and strate-
gies. This fundamentally similar context should lead to the development
of co-operative strategies for dealing with similar problems and opportu-
nities. Seventh and lastly, as argued by neo-functionalists (Haas, 1958;
Rosamond, 2000), with the successful expansion of European integra-
tion and the common market strategy in the 1980s and 1990s one
would expect this success to spill-over into the social arena. As EU social
policy expanded and became increasingly embedded in the European pol-
icy process one would expect social NGOs to be increasingly integrated
and co-opted into the policy process. This integration should lessen their
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fundamental national antagonisms, increase the benefits of co-operative
action and, thus, promote the development of collaborative/co-operative
relations with each other.
On the other hand, a general overview of the social NGOs also presents
several reasons why co-operative strategies could be very difficult to
develop and maintain. First, despite their similar weak position relative to
other non-social EU NGOs, there is a distinct hierarchy between the social
NGOs. The most obvious indicator is staff and financial resources. The
largest and most impressively organised are the European Youth Forum
(EYF) and European Women’s Lobby (EWL). With staff numbers of 16–20
and 10–12, annual budgets of Û2 million and Û1 million and an impres-
sive network of expert advisors to draw upon, the EYF and EWL are capa-
ble of performing a variety of lobbying and advocacy activities (providing
expert policy and legal advice, composing proposals for the Commission
and Parliament, responding to legislative developments and competing for
EU project proposals). At the other extreme would be organisations like
Eurolink Age and Save the Children. Despite representing major organisa-
tions within the member states, both receive minimal (under Û100,000)
or no funding from the EU and have one to two staff members.
Consequently, staff time and energies are concentrated on a few policies or
events. Policy initiatives are minimal and scare time is often used to create
proposals for projects with uncertain funding. Obviously, co-operative
strategies between these actors must take into account their relative capa-
bility imbalances. From their position of strength, the EYF and EWL have
little reason to put time and effort (altering their proposals, pushing for
joint issues, making time to deal with their concerns, etc.) into co-operat-
ing with Eurolink Age or Save the Children. At the same time, Eurolink
Age and Save the Children may fear that co-operation with a larger organ-
isation would merely overwhelm their own activities.
Second, though most EU social NGOs rely heavily on EU funding, there
is a marked difference between the three main types of funding (A-budget
line funding, B-budget line funding and project funding) which the EU
provides. Of the three types, A-budget line funding is the most stable and
secure. Basically, A-budget lines are for funding EU administrative activi-
ties, are generally seen as long term economic commitments of over five
to six years and are relatively immune from budgetary challenges in the
parliament. Only a few social NGOs are funded with A-budget lines. The
key examples are the EWL and the EYF. B-budget line funding is linked to
particular policy areas and proposals, is based on two to three year pro-
grammes and is fully reviewed at the end of each programme. Currently,
most of the funding for social NGOs comes through B-budget lines. These
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budget lines are much more unstable, politically weaker and must be 
constantly defended and justified by the social NGOs. Lastly, project fund-
ing is utilised by most social NGOs as well. However, project funding is
generally short term (under one to two years), takes a significant amount
of resources to obtain (particularly following the creation of detailed EU
application, implementation and evaluation procedures) and carries no
guarantee of further funding once the project is complete. These different
types of funding create distinctive pressures and needs for the social
NGOs. Not only must they compete over how the budget is allocated, 
but over the type of budget line which will support their activities and
individual EU projects. 
Third, as discussed earlier, the social NGOs display clear elements of 
an extensive and intensive informal network. However, this informality
can easily lead to ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups and divisive personal struggles.
During my recent interviews with social NGOs most respondents agreed
that informal relations were generally good between the social NGOs.
Nevertheless, there were clear antagonisms between some of the groups,
particularly between poorly funded B-budget line NGOs and better funded
A-budget line NGOs. Difficulties such as these are not unusual between
interest groups, or most types of organisations. It is merely important to
point out that these divisions create difficulties for co-ordinating common
strategies between the NGOs.
Fourth, by most accounts, the Platform has been a successful formal
network of organising social NGOs and co-ordinating their responses to
common social policy difficulties and strategies. However, a number of
tensions were apparent during my interviews with Platform members.
Some members were concerned that they were not being heard by the
Platform. Others were afraid that the Commission and parliament would
increasingly turn to the Platform for consultations rather than to their
own organisations due to the Commission’s and parliament’s desire for
one single point of social NGO input. Some even complained that the
Platform might become a career platform for particularly ambitious NGO
actors. Overall, the Platform was seen as dynamic and useful, particu-
larly during the past two to three years. Nevertheless, tensions within the
members towards the Platform remain.
Fifth, despite general ideological similarities regarding social policy and
welfarist issues, the social NGOs often represent groups that can be
strongly antagonistic to each other. Some examples are obvious. The
International Gay and Lesbian Alliance sits rather uneasily with the 
family organisations. Furthermore, my interviews revealed a number of
tensions between other groups, which on the surface should be close
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allies, such as the EYF and Save the Children. The key point is that despite
some general ideological similarities, these organisations often represent
antagonistic groups and are caught within a competitive situation for
funding and institutional attention from the EU. It is not surprising that
group tensions would emerge.
Sixth, despite general similarities, their institutional position and 
context can vary remarkably. For examples, on top of international,
European and member state dynamics the EDF has to deal with complex
divisions within its own membership over types of disabilities and their
relative importance within the disability movement. The EYF is a strongly
EU oriented organisation with a significant and secure budget that pays
little attention to other international organisations or issues. Meanwhile,
the European Public Health Alliance has a strong link to the World
Health Organisation and other international health forums and is ham-
pered in its EU activities by the fact that it is linked to the only section of
the Employment and Social Affairs DG (formerly DG5) that is based in
Luxembourg rather than Brussels. Another example is the European
Migrants Forum which has a very diverse and divided membership and
competes against other European migrant organisations for EU funding
and attention. The key implication is that like the complex and 
multi-level EU, social NGOs inhabit an even more complex and diverse
universe of demands and interests. Given this complexity, it is impressive
that these groups are able to co-operate at all.
Seventh and lastly, I would argue that some degree of spill-over has
occurred and that social integration has been pushed forward by eco-
nomic integration. However, this spill-over has not been even or constant.
As discussed in other works (Geyer, 2000; Hantrais, 2000; Leibfried and
Pierson, 1995), EU social policy has developed in fits and starts and is
very uneven. EU social policy is well established in gender, youth and
some areas of labour policy; less developed in disability, public health and
anti-poverty policy; and poorly established in anti-racism and elderly pol-
icy. These differing levels of policy development generate different tactics
and interests for the NGOs. NGOs in entrenched policy areas may try to
focus on legal channels and strategies to further their particular agendas.
Meanwhile, NGOs in weaker areas may focus all of their energies on a
new legislative initiative or treaty base. These differing conditions and
strategies may easily generate tensions and divisions between the more
and less successful social NGOs. Moreover, these differences are very
unlikely to be dissipated in the near future.
Overall, this general review oversimplifies the issue of co-operative vs.
conflictual dynamics between the social NGOs. Undoubtedly, a significant
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amount of co-operative behaviour is occurring between the groups.
Nevertheless, this co-operation is not easy or automatic and has to 
overcome significant and complex clashes of interest and institutional
positions. To explore more concretely the delicate nature of social NGOs’
co-operative strategies the article will now turn to the cases of the 1998
funding crisis, Red Card protest and current campaign to promote the
civil dialogue.
T H E 1 9 9 8 F U N D I N G C R I S I S ,  R E D C A R D C A M PA I G N A N D C I V I L
D I A L O G U E
As most observers would admit, funding for EU social NGOs emerged in a
random fashion. Some groups received funding in the 1980s and have A-
budget lines (the EWL and EYF). Most groups were founded in the 1990s
and funding was based on Declaration 23 of the Maastricht Treaty which
stated that:
The Conference stresses the importance, in pursuing the objectives of Article117… 
of cooperation between the latter and charitable associations and foundations as institu-
tions responsible for social welfare establishments and services
These groups receive a combination of B-budget line funding and project
based funding. This ad hoc development was due to several factors. The
fact that the EU was pushing into new social policy areas, which lacked a
base in the treaties, made clear funding guidelines difficult. Also, the
development of parliament’s powers of budgetary oversight complicated
the politics of funding for social policy NGOs. The Parliament has 
generally been a keen supporter of social policy. However, as the political
complexion of parliament changes, so do its social policy positions. Lastly,
although the Employment and Social Affairs DG (formerly DGV) has been
a strong social NGO supporter it is also caught within budgetary strug-
gles with different DGs and the Council. Consequently, funding for NGOs
has been uneven, unstable and lacking an overall coherent strategy or
justification.
This incoherence was starkly highlighted by the impact of Case 106 of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In May 1998 nearly Û1 billion of EU
social policy funding was brought into question by the results of a 
decision from the ECJ on Case 106/96. The issue upon which this deci-
sion was based was located in the inter-institutional struggles between
the EU Council and EU Commission. In 1994, the Council rejected the
Commission’s 1994 EU anti-poverty programme. The Commission and
Parliament responded by attempting to continue funding some of its 
earlier anti-poverty programmes through their discretionary budgetary
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powers. In 1996, the British Conservative government (backed by
Germany, Denmark and the Council) challenged the right of the
Commission to allocate these funds without a ‘legal base’, such as a
Decision from the Council. On 12 May 1998, the ECJ found in favour of
Britain, arguing that the Commission had spent money to finance ‘signif-
icant’ actions which the Commission could only do if it had a legal base
(i.e. a Council decision). Following the ECJ’s ruling, on 10 June the
Commission decided to launch a review of all budget lines (over 100)
without a legal basis and to freeze all lines without a legal base during the
review process. This result unleashed a wave of confusion in the EU insti-
tutions since it curtailed the right of the Commission to allocate nearly
Û1 billion of social funding, reasserted the power of the Council over the
Commission, and antagonised the EU Parliament since many of its small
projects were funded with discretionary Commission funds.
EU social NGOs were shocked and dismayed. Not only was their project
funding under threat, but their own existence was threatened as well
since many received a substantial proportion of their organisational
income from the EU. In response, the social NGOs took three key steps:
the mobilisation of social NGOs through the Platform, the publicising of
the crisis through the Red Card campaign and the formation of an
alliance with development NGOs and human rights NGOs.
In many ways, this was the crucial moment for the Platform. The
Platform had only been established in the mid-1990s and was still strug-
gling to find a clear role in its relationship to the social NGOs. As shown
earlier, the distinctive positions and interests of the social NGOs makes it
very difficult to find clear ‘horizontal’ issues which they could all agree
upon. However, the funding crisis was just such an issue. The Platform
quickly became the centrepoint for organising the response to the fund-
ing crisis, organising actions at member state and the European level. For
example, it encouraged all member organisations to write letters to their
MEPs, Council representatives and national governments protesting the
crisis. Further, using the Social Policy Forum, a bi-annual meeting of over
2000 social NGOs which just happened to be occurring in late June
1998, the Platform organised a ‘red card’ protest. Taking its signal from
the World Cup (going on in France at that time), the Platform distributed
‘red cards’ to all of the participants at the Social Policy Forum. Whenever
an EU official was present the participants would show them the ‘red
card’.
To co-ordinate the ‘red card’ protest and meetings with EU officials, the
Platform formed an alliance with the development and human rights
NGOs. This alliance led to an impressive and unprecedented degree of 
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publicity for the normally unknown social NGOs and the funding crisis.
Co-ordinated by the Platform, this grouping had two main demands. They
called for an immediate resumption of budgetary allocation for all of the
NGO budget lines. The key point for all of the NGOs was that their various
budgets were frozen. They could do nothing, continue existing operations,
plan for future developments and/or pay staff (!), until the crisis was
resolved. Furthermore, they demanded that the larger issue of the general
status of NGOs and their relationship to the EU institutions be addressed.
As a May 1998 Platform document argued before the funding crisis:
At present, there is no legal basis for consulting NGOs. Consultations are still initiated by
the individual Commission Directorates General when they feel the need with no moves
to draw everything together. The first essential step in this direction is for the Commission
to compile a List of INGOs [International Non-Governmental Organisations] with which it
would consult on a regular and systematic basis…The compilation of this List would also
be an opportunity for regulating the relations between listed INGOs and the European
Commission in a formal legal instrument, setting out the rights and duties of each.
(Platform, May 1998)
Under pressure from this alliance the Commission and Parliament began
to actively seek ways to keep the complicated array of programmes afloat
while social NGOs struggled to make sure that their particular policy
areas were saved. The immediate goal of the Platform was to release the
funds already allocated in existing budget lines. Pressure continued until
the Budget Council meeting on 17 July when over 75per cent of budget
lines were unblocked. Furthermore, the Council encouraged the
Parliament and Commission to find appropriate bases for the still blocked
lines, particularly re-framing and re-grouping them under Article 13
and/or 137 of the Amsterdam Treaty. The Council also clarified the defin-
ition of a ‘pilot action’ and a ‘preparatory action’ and set spending and
time limits for both. Most importantly for the NGOs, the Council decided
that preparatory actions connected to the Amsterdam Treaty could start
before the ratification of the treaty and that a preparatory action could
continue even if a programme from which it is proposed is still awaiting a
legal basis. This was absolutely essential to maintain funding for the
NGOs through 1998 and 1999. However, it left the budgetary position
beyond 1999 uncertain.
Throughout 1999 and 2000, the Platform, social NGOs and their sup-
porters in the Commission and Parliament worked tirelessly to create a
more stable and secure position for the social NGOs. This work revolved
around the institutionalisation of the civil dialogue. Before discussing their
most recent activities it is necessary to take a brief look at the foundation
of the idea of the civil dialogue.
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The idea of the civil dialogue has its roots in the political traditions of the
Netherlands and Germany and had been discussed within the EU since the
early-1990s (Kendall and Anheier, 1999; Platform, November 1999; Taylor,
2000). Declaration 23 of the Maastricht Treaty mentioned the importance
of dialogue between the EU and ‘charitable associations and foundations…
responsible for social welfare establishments and services’. In 1996, the
report from the Committee of Sages on the future of civil and social rights in
Europe concluded that both a social dialogue (involving capital, labour and
the EU) and a civil dialogue (involving the broader NGO community and the
EU) were necessary for the promotion of fundamental rights:
Non-governmental associations and organisations seem likely to play an increasing role
in society, especially as regards the rights of the unemployed and the elderly. How they
can be recognised as partners in this slow, self-transforming progress of society towards
the recognition and implementation of new rights, especially those intended to prevent or
end exclusion, is thus an important aspect of the fundamental rights question.
(Committee of Sages, 1996, p. 55)
Furthermore, at the same time Employment and Social Affairs DG in the
Commission and the Social Affairs Committee in the Parliament were
working together to promote a more general Social Policy Forum, a bi-
annual mass meeting of all NGOs linked to the social field. The first was
held in 1996 and the second in 1998. Despite the significant participa-
tion of NGOs (over 2000 attended the second forum) and the success of
the second forum at helping to raise the funding crisis issue, general NGO
opinion of the forums was divided. Most NGOs found the forums useful,
but did not see them as a replacement for full consultation with the EU
institutions (Hughes, 1999, p. 3). Lastly, in 1996 the Commission and
Parliament created and funded the Platform of European Social NGOs in
order to strengthen the voice of and co-ordination between the social
NGOs and consequently the civil dialogue.
The Employment and Social Affairs DG, Platform and, in particular,
Employment and Social Affairs Committee in the Parliament (led by MEP
Stephen Hughes until mid-1999 and currently chaired by the French MEP
M. Rocard) continued to press for a more institutionalised form of civil dia-
logue. The Committee held a series of hearings on the civil dialogue in
early 1998 with the social NGOs. The conclusions of these hearings were
integrated into the Parliament’s Ghilardotti Report on various aspects of
the non-profit sector. The conclusion of the report called for, ‘a serious,
structured sectoral dialogue to be set in motion between the European
institutions and the NGOs represented at European level’ and saw the
Platform as a model for other sectors of the civil dialogue (Hughes, 1999,
p. 5). Following this, the Commission and the Parliament both established
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regular twice yearly meetings with the Platform. Despite these develop-
ments, the Commission did not include a call for the development of a civil
dialogue in its 1998–2000 Social Action Programme.
In the aftermath of the funding crisis, the Platform has concentrated
much of its resources on the creation of the civil dialogue. In June 1999 it
published a document on social NGO funding which made four proposals
for strengthening the civil dialogue:  
1. European NGOs who comply to clearly laid out criteria of representa-
tivity, effectiveness, good governance and management and compli-
ance with equal opportunities should be eligible to receive core fund-
ing, which should be on a multi-annual basis and include appropriate
secretariat and management costs, as well as the costs of convening
statutory meetings.
2. An equitable and efficient schedule for grant applications and pay-
ments needs to be put in place…
3. Projects and budgets should be agreed in principle between the
Commission and the NGO at least four months before the start of the
year.
4. The responsibility for the matters such as contracts, payments, calls
for projects and problems over funding should be clearly defined both
at the level of officials and at the political level. (Platform, June 1999,
p. 2)
Later, in October 1999, after the Platform was made aware of a forthcom-
ing Commission document on the civil dialogue, the Platform attempted
to structure the early debate with a number of ‘political recommenda-
tions’. In this document, the Platform re-emphasised the important role
of the social NGOs and stressed the importance which Declaration 38 of
the Amsterdam Treaty gave them:
The Conference recognises the important contribution made by voluntary service activi-
ties to developing social solidarity.
However, the Platform emphasised that there was a growing need to
develop a ‘more horizontal and coherent approach to the consultation of
NGOs’ which would be based on, ‘an Article (in the Treaty of the
European Union) to give a legal underpinning to the civil dialogue’
(Platform, October 1999, p. 2). Finally, in order to implement the dia-
logue, it should be made into a ‘structured process, which includes the
elaboration, monitoring and evaluation of EU policies’. Also, the
Commission should, ‘compile a list of accredited NGOs operating at the
EU level with which it would consult’ (Platform, October 1999, p. 2).
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Overall, the Platform was trying to play both a detailed and general
strategy. At the detailed level, it was trying to solve a number of the
annoying budgetary aspects of the social NGO – EU relationship includ-
ing issues of timing for payments, criteria for EU funding eligibility and
defining responsibilities. These were obvious small problems that were
afflicting a number of social NGOs. However, this detailed strategy was
linked to the larger one of institutionalising the civil dialogue in the EU
treaty and forcing the EU to create a list or system for accrediting and
supporting social NGOs. This combination of strategies was clearly neces-
sary to satisfy the needs of the social NGOs who were directly affected by
the funding crisis and the interests of those who were less affected.
Moreover, the emphasis on getting the EU to create a list of accredited
NGOs was particularly interesting in that the Platform clearly wanted to
avoid being the group responsible for picking which NGOs were, and were
not, acceptable. This would put it in a delicate political situation it did not
desire, nor was capable of resolving. 
Unfortunately for the Platform and social NGOs, the Commission and
Council were reluctant to quickly alter the existing nature of the civil dia-
logue. In its most recent document on the civil dialogue, after listing the
various benefits of the civil dialogue, the Commission resisted a number
of the Platform’s demands. In relation to the complaints about the overly
bureaucratic proposal process, the Commission argued that:
Regarding funding, the NGOs must accept, for example, that there will always be a legiti-
mate need for the Commission to impose certain conditions and controls to safeguard
community funds. NGOs have a duty to demonstrate that they have the expertise, man-
agement systems and internal quality control systems appropriate to the work they are
undertaking. (Commission, 2000, p. 9)
For the existing informal contacts between the NGOs and EU, ‘the steer-
ing group sees the current informal co-operation as useful and wishes it
to continue’ (Commission, 2000, p. 11). However, the document did
stress that, ‘The Commission therefore wishes to develop a framework of
principles for creating a more structured dialogue with NGOs’
(Commission, 2000, p. 12). The document went on to outline the possi-
ble lines of debate over how best to institutionalise the civil dialogue.
Regarding a new legal basis for the civil dialogue, the document only
mentioned it in passing and made no specific proposals. Regarding fund-
ing issues, the document noted that the division between A- and B-bud-
get lines was incoherent and arbitrary and that the Commission intends
to develop a new system. However, this was clearly linked to a variety of
other issues and was not expected to be resolved until the 2001 budget.
Lastly, the document rejected the demands for the Commission to accredit
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social NGOs arguing that the Commission had always, ‘wanted to main-
tain a dialogue which is as open as possible without having to enforce an
accreditation system’ (Commission, 2000, p. 14).
As of Summer 2000, the state of affairs for the funding crisis and civil
dialogue is one of stasis and small-scale adjustments. The Parliament and
Commission recognise that the system of funding for the social NGOs is ad
hoc and confusing. However, the solution to these difficulties is wrapped
around a number of larger administrative and political issues. For exam-
ple, the elimination of the distinction between A- and B-budget lines will
obviously have a fundamental impact on the administrative functioning
of the entire EU. Moreover, not only is this an administrative problem but
it has clear political implications as well. The social NGOs benefited from
a supportive Parliament which was able and willing to establish multiple
and ad hoc budget lines to support them. Rationalisation of these budget
lines may not only threaten the social NGOs, but it may threaten the
power of the Parliament in relation to the Council. Finally, in the
Presidency conclusions at the March Lisbon Council, the Council con-
cluded, under the section on ‘promoting social inclusion’ that it will,
pursue its reflection on the future direction of social policy… with a view to reaching
agreement on a European Social Agenda at the Nice European Council in December,
including the initiatives of the different partners involved.
The issue of the civil dialogue is alive, but it is clearly going to have to wait
until December 2000 before the Council will take a view on it.
C O N C L U S I O N S
As is well known, the EU is a complex multilevel institution. At the centre
of this complexity are the social NGOs, busily balancing member,
national, European and international developments, interests and strate-
gies. In this complex context structure, co-operative action is difficult to
achieve even with a number of institutional similarities and formal and
informal networks. As the funding crisis and its aftermath demonstrated,
only the most basic of issues can result in significant and sustained 
co-operative action. The crisis not only provided a focus for collective
action for social NGOs, but encouraged the revival of the languishing
Platform and created opportunities for linkages to other environmental
and development NGOs and labour organisations. Nevertheless, other,
less fundamental issues, would be unlikely to generate this level of 
co-operative activity.
If the above is correct, then the solution to the collective weakness of
the social NGOs would be to simplify or organise their complex context
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structure in order to create more common issues around which co-operative
strategies could emerge. In the context of a complex and multilevel EU,
this would not be an easy task. Nevertheless, there are two main groups
of actors who could potentially do it: the EU institutions (particularly the
Commission and Parliament) and the social NGOs. As seen above, the
Commission and Parliament have been strong supporters of social NGOs,
but have been unable or unwilling to increase and organise NGO funding
or act as a gatekeeper/organiser for social NGOs. The funding issue is
obviously linked to larger political battles within and between the
Parliament, Commission and Council. Greater funding would clearly
have an immediate impact on the NGOs. However, in the current context
it is extremely difficult to imagine a constellation of political forces which
would enable significantly greater funding. Moreover, the unwillingness
of the Commission and/or Parliament to act as a gatekeeper seems to be
based on a desire to maintain the pluralism of the social NGO community,
to avoid direct responsibility for the funding situation of the social 
NGOs and to continue the complexity of the budgetary process in order to
avoid the reassertion of Council control over budgetary procedures.
Nevertheless, these blockages will have to be overcome by pro-social 
policy forces within the EU if a more powerful social NGO movement and
social policy are to be created. The Commission and/or Parliament 
will have to accept a greater degree of responsibility for the social 
NGOs including: greater funding, more equal funding and acting as a
gatekeeper of funded NGOs. This raises obvious problems of NGO inde-
pendence in relation to the EU. However, in the current context, where
NGOs are so weak, it may be a reasonable price to pay.
The other key actors are the social NGOs themselves. Driven by their
weakness and their formal and informal networks, the social NGOs have
already developed a degree of co-operative activities and co-ordinated pol-
icy action. However, their divergent interests and complex context struc-
ture constantly undercut these collective strategies on all but the most
fundamental issues. One response to this weakness could be greater NGO
organisation. Using the Platform as a base, the NGOs could agree to pool
their limited resources to demand greater and consistent funding and 
key policy strategies for a recognised group of social NGOs. In essence, the
Platform, or some similar organisation, would become the NGO gate-
keeper, removing the administrative and political burden from the
Parliament/Commission and strengthening the organised NGOs in the
process. 
This strategy is full of obvious risks and difficulties. How would one deter-
mine an ‘acceptable’ social NGO? How would funding be allocated? Would
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it lead to a more powerful social NGO voice? Would the organised social
NGOs be co-opted by the EU and ignore their national and sub-national
roots? There are no clear answers to these questions. Nevertheless, the risks
may be worth taking. At present, the social NGOs have a great deal of 
freedom, but little influence. Sacrificing some of their independence 
for greater organisational coherence may be the only way for them to 
significantly promote EU social policy.
Lastly, it is likely that some combination of these two strategies may
emerge, combining a stronger central social NGO organisation with
greater regulation by or reliance on the Commission and Parliament.
Predicting the exact structure is clearly beyond the limits of this article.
Nevertheless, given the current complex context structure, social NGOs
will have to be organised or organise themselves in order to become a
major factor in the future of EU social policy. 
N O T E S
1 The Platform was created in mid-1996 to promote and co-ordinate the development of the
social NGOs. It has a small staff (four to five members) and is primarily funded by the EU.
2 Recently, the general secretary of a leading social NGO moved on to a position in the
Commission and was replaced by the head of another social NGO who was married to the head
of another social NGO. This is not an attack on any of these individuals. It merely high-
lights the very close informal relationships between the social NGOs.
3 Both Employment and Social Affairs P. Flynn and A. Diamontopoulou have encouraged the
social NGOs to comment on both general and specific social policy proposals. In March 2000,
Commissioner Diamontopoulou has issued a general social policy proposal outline to the social
NGOs in order to develop strategies and ideas and gauge the level of political support for certain
initiatives.
4 In October 2000 Eurolink Age merged with two other organisations to form the European
Older People’s Platform. According to the Director of Eurolink Age, this was done to strengthen
the influence of organisations for older people and to create a ‘more European’ organisation to
enhance funding possibilities from the EU level. 
5 A recent exception to this was the challenging for the EWL’s A-budget line in the parliament by
the Irish MEP Dana Rosemary Scallon, the former Eurovision song contest winner, who was
rumoured to have opposed the funding of the EWL because of its stance on the right to abortion.
6 I performed twenty-one semi-structured interviews during 21–29 March 2000. These
included twelve members of the Platform of European Social NGOs, actors within the Platform,
Commission, Parliament, and ETUC. All of the interviewees were selected because of their close
engagement with the EU social policy process. Of the Platform members, I interviewed disabil-
ity, anti-poverty, youth, elderly, family, gender, child, anti-racism, and health organisation
representatives. They were selected to provide a wide spread of social issues and to obtain a
general balance between large (gender, youth, disability) and small (elderly, child and family)
organisations. The interviews were open, but structured around three main areas: the impact
of the funding crisis on the NGO and NGO community, the activities and usefulness of the
Platform and the challenges to collective action within the NGO community. Interviews with
Non-NGO actors were oriented towards obtaining information about the budget crisis, Red
Card protest and civil dialogue, the position of the governmental actors towards the NGOs and
Platform and their views regarding the future of EU social policy. 
7 This incoherence may be in the interest of the Parliament since it is a demonstration of the
Parliament’s control over the budget process. If there were clear lines of control and spending
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guidelines, the Council would be in a better position to exert detailed control over the budget
process.
8 Social NGOs appealed to the new Labour government in 1997 to withdraw the case. However,
it chose not to do so.
9 The Commissioner for the budget, Mr. Liikanen, was accused of interpreting the ECJ’s ruling in
an unnecessarily strict manner by Commissioners Bonino and Flynn. However, a number of
scandals had already rocked the Commission and it was not surprising that Liikanen was
determined to pursue a hard line.
10 In a Platform document written after the ‘Red Card’ protest, the Platform admitted that: ‘the
Social Forum had been a heaven sent opportunity’ (Platform, October 1998, p.  9).
11 Even the British newspapers, generally unwilling to notice any social policy activity at the EU
level, carried various articles on the budget crisis and social NGOs’ activities.
12 A pilot action is an exploratory expenditure which may or may not lead to a programme. It
may not last over two years and cannot spend over Û16 million in any year. A preparatory
action is an action leading to the creation of a programme with a legal basis. It may last three
years and not exceed Û75 million in expenditure.
13 A fifth lesser proposal included a call to reform the Vademecum agreement on bank grants
over Û100,000.
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